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them to justify prompt desegregation. On the other hand, one can
sympathize with a community that objects to being called upon to
undergo the trauma of desegregation (if it is going to be traumatic)
merely because it happens to have few Negroes or to have been more
statesmanlike in handling racial tensions in the past.
There is in fact some reason to doubt that the foregoing social con-
ditions are closely related to rigidity of racial attitudes.4 There is no
feasible way to determine the attitudes of a community toward de-
segregation except to carry out the policy and observe the results.
Already we have evidence that the attitudes of school officials toward
desegregation is a major factor affecting a community's reactions to
desegregation.
The argument of this note has been a simple one: the alleged
logical grounds for gradualness of desegregation are equivocal. The
same arguments support a policy of prompt desegregation and integra-
tion for at least a sizeable fraction of pupils.
COMMENT ON A REVIEW
By PRiomam D. GLLiAM, JR.*
This Journal welcomes the foregoing sociologist's review of a legal
article. The lawyer and the judge need the assistance of all the sci-
ences in solving all legal problems, and more especially, in solving
such complex problems as those involved in the School Segregation
Cases.1 Perhaps, however, a lawyer's comment on some of Professor
Anderson's points may not be inappropriate here.
In considering the adequacy of legal precedent for "establishing a
principle of gradualness" we should remember that the School Segre-
gation Cases are equity cases in which the plaintiffs are seeking the
extraordinary remedy of injunction. Persons whose legal rights are
violated have other sanctions available,2 and they are entitled to have
4 See the writer's "Inequality in Schooling in the South," American Journal of
Sociology, 1955, 60:547-61.
* College of Law, University of Kentucky1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
(1954); Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954),
(hereinafter together referred to as the Brown decision); Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 653 (1955), (hereinafter referred to
as the Brown decree).
2 These are, in these cases, the tort and criminal sanctions of the Civil Rights
Acts. 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 to 1986, inc., (1952); 18 U.S.C. Sections 241-242
(1952). See Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools:
The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Acts, 65 Yale L.J. 630 (1956). But
note that it is an open question whether the "right" recognized by the Brown
decision is "an immediate right to attend an integrated school," an immediate
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those sanctions applied immediately.3 In equity, however, the plaintiff
may not be entitled to any relief at all, even though it is found that his
rights have been violated.4 Thus, it would not have been contrary to
equitable principles if the Supreme Court had, in the Brown decision,
merely declared the constitutional right and denied injunctive relief,
leaving the problem to be resolved by the application of the other
sanctions provided by law.
The books abound with authority for the proposition that it is the
duty of a court of equity "to strike a proper balance between the needs
of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief."5
Directing that the District Courts follow equitable principles the
Court, in the Brown decree, 6 said: "Traditionally, equity has been
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by
a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."
Only two cases were cited,7 but they amply support the Court's posi-
tion. No case involving flexibility in molding a decree to protect a
"right to have a local school board make a prompt and reasonable start towards
integration", or an "immediate right to set the district court machinery in motion
on the course delimited by the Brown decree." Id. at 682.
3 But as pointed out in note 2, supra, it may be that no right has yet been
violated in the cases under discussion.
4 In re Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202 (1868), where the
Court refused to enjoin an admitted nuisance because a greater injury would
result from granting an injunction than from refusing and leaving plaintiff to his
tort action. And see Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 118
Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904), and its sequel, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 27 S.Ct. 618, 51 L. Ed. 1038, 11 Ann. Cas. 488 (1906), 237 U.S.
474, 35 S.Ct. 631, 59 L.Ed. 1054 (1915), 240 U.S. 650, 36 S.Ct. 465, 60 L.Ed.
846 (1916). Here the farms of a small number of mountain people were being
rendered unusable by fumes from two large smelters. The Tennessee court, point-
ing out that the farms were worth only about $1000.00 and that the smelters,
worth around $2,000,000.00, employed 12,000 people and were the main eco-
nomic support of the community, denied an injunction, leaving the plaintiffs to
their tort action. At the suit of the State of Georgia, however, the Supreme Court
of the United States took a different view and, applying the principle of grad-
ualness, allowed, but forced the defendants to improve their processes gradually
so as to lessen the volume of fumes blown over plaintiff's citizens' lands. The
result was a valuable by-product for defendants. Comment: Injunction-Nuisance-
Balance of Convenience, 37 Yale L.J. 96 (1927). Each of these solutions was in
accordance with traditional equity principles, but it is obvious that the solution
adopted by the United States Supreme Court was the more rational. The Ten-
nessee court did not study the matter carefully enough, stuck too closely to its
law books.
5 Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 644, 92 L.Ed. 784,
789 (1948); 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th Ed. 1918) Section 28; 5
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed. 1941), Section 1338.
6 Note 1, supra.
7 Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239, 56 S.Ct. 204, 209, 80 L.Ed. 192
(1935); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330, 64 S.Ct. 587, 591, 592, 88
L.Ed. 754 (1944). The Court might have cited numerous anti-trust cases, such as
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632, 55 L.Ed. 63
(1912), or nuisance cases such as those cited in note 4, supra.
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constitutional right was cited, and presumably there are none., But
the source of the right is not the important thing. All rights, regardless
of source, are entitled to protection on the same basis. Equity should
treat them all alike, granting or refusing injunctive relief not with
regard to the source of the right but with regard to the effects of the
decree.
A lawyer should be pardoned for hesitating to believe that any
legal proposition has been conclusively demonstrated. In most cases,
as a court approaches decision, it has available alternative policies,
each supported by legal doctrine. While we, perhaps, still have the
principle of stare decisis in our common-law system, it is notorious
that courts have never been bound by preceding doctrine, although
they may follow it in most cases, or at any rate, mouth the fiction that
they are following it. In the brocess of decision a court is continually
subject to two pressures, the social need for stability of legal norm
and the social need for decisions in accordance with contemporary
notions of justice. These needs often conflict. The conflict is resolved
one way or the other depending upon when, where, how competently,
by whom and on whom the pressures are applied. The result is a
sort of flexible stability which tends to justify defining law as a dynamic
process of ordering relations in the comminity. While prediction is
one of the functions of a lawyer, he hesitates to predict in such strong
terms as "conclusively."
If the Court, in passing on implementation of the Brown decree,
should adopt the reasoning of the "white primary" cases, 9 it could
easily hold almost any device adopted by a southern state unconsti-
tutional. But the Brown decision does not require the Court to go so
far, and the primaries certainly present a problem different from that
of school segregation. If a state should set up a three-fold school
system, one school open to all, one open to Negroes only, and one open
to whites only, it is obvious that in any area where there is any prob-
lem the legally integrated school will be attended by Negroes only.
If in such case a Negro should seek admission to the white school, it
would not be contrary to the Brown decision for the Court to say that
8 It would seem that a sociologist who supports the Brown decision, note 1,
supra, would hesitate to demand precedent, for that decision was contrary to the
great weight of authority, including a precedent in the Supreme Court itself as
recent as Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172 (1927).
9 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944); Rice
v. Elmore, 165 F.2d. 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. den. 833 U.S. 875 (1948); Brown
v. Baskin, 174 F.2d. 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct.
809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953). The effect of these decisions is that no group can
have a political party the members of which agree to support anything Negroes
do not approve, an absurd result, reached, no doubt, because the court thought
the plan in Baskin was a mere subterfuge to avoid the rule of Allwright and Rice.
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Brown did not mean that integration was compulsory but only that
compulsory segregation was prohibited and that, the state having pro-
vided a school open to all, whatever segregation resulted was voluntary
and not state action.'
0
Moreover, if a state should abolish its public schools and then ap-
propriate the same amount of money to each child for tuition in a
school of his choice, it would not be contrary to the Brown decision
for the Court to say that the only state action present accords exact
equal protection; provided, of course, that the schools themselves are
genuinely private. It would be extremely difficult for the Court to
hold that operation of a genuinely private school is state action, as this
would endanger the position of parochial schools. 1
It is not the purpose here to be exhaustive, but merely to suggest
that it might be premature to say that compulsory integration in the
schools has been made conclusively inevitable legally by the Brown
decision.
Professor Anderson's suggestion as to immediate assimilation of
the qualified Negro pupils with the qualified white pupils, etc., makes
sense on paper. But even in the absence of the race problem, proposals
to segregate pupils in accordance with intellectual ability have not met
with much acceptance in America. It is said to be undemocratic to
do so, or harmful to the less able pupil, or harmful to the gifted stu-
dent.12 Is it likely that such proposals will be any more acceptable
with the race problem mixed in?
The problem presented by these cases is how to remove from the
Negro the "Mark of oppression,".3 and the problem must be solved in
a nation in which the overwhelmingly dominant race almost unani-
10 See Judge John J. Parker's statement on opening of retrial of Briggs v.
Elliott, South Carolina's branch of Brown, 1 Southern School News, No. 2, Aug.
1955, p. 6. Also see Alabama legislative action for a three-school system. 2 South-
ern School News, No. 8, Feb. 195 6,p. 6, and No. 9, Mar. 1956, pp. 1 and 6.
11 When it was at first believed that the entry of the Brown decree, note 1,
supra, meant integration by September, 1955, the authorities of Prince Edward
County, Virginia, (the County before the Court), took legal steps to close all pub-
lic schools at once. White citizens then raised a large sum to pay white teachers for
white schools privately. 2 Southern School News, No. 1, Jul. 6, 1955, p. 15. Pre-
sumably the intention was to use the public school buildings. Unless the use of such
buildings were based on a sale or lease made in "absolutely good faith", the plan
would have fallen under the rule of Tate v. Department of Conservation and
Development, 133 F.Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955). But conceivably plans could be
devised which a court could uphold. At any rate there would be no schools for
Negroes until the question was resolved. See infra, next to last paragraph.'2 Eckhauser, The Gifted Child-the Neglected Child, 38 New York State
Education 408 (1951); Witty, Educational Provision for Gifted Children, 76
School and Society 177 (1952); Knight, Edgar Wallace, Some Disturbing Edu-
cational Contradictions, 76 School and Society 337 (1952).
13 Kardiner and Ovesey, The Mark of Oppression, a Psychological Study of
the American Negro (1951). This work shows the devastating effect of dis-
crimination on Negro personality.
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mously holds to a "theory of color caste," the basic concern of which is
for "race purity", "the primary and essential command" of which is
"to prevent amalgamation," the whites being "determined to utilize
every means to this end." This theory requires rejection of "social
equality" as a "precaution to hinder miscegenation and particularly
intermarriage." "The danger of miscegenation" is considered "so tre-
mendous that the segregation and discrimination inherent in the re-
fusal of 'social equality' must be extended to nearly all spheres of life"
including education.' 4
One studying Myrdal's great work could scarcely expect that the
problem of segregation can be solved by merely posting a copy of the
Brown decision at the door of each court house. The solution will not
come by stressing the establishment of doctrinaire principles. The con-
centration must be on improving the lot of the Negro, with con-
tinually in mind the adage that "politics is the art of the practicable."
The best efforts of lawyers and of specialists in all the other social
sciences will be needed. There will be required of the Negro great
patience, combined with an appropriately varied amount of persistence.
Here, as in all cases requiring infusion of content into the great
constitutional phrases such as "equal protection" or involving equitable
balancing of interests, is a place for the application of the theories of
jurisprudence developed by Professors Myres S. McDougal and Harold
D. Lasswell in their seminar on Law, Science and Policy in Yale Law
School.15 According to their theories a court should seek the norm for
its decision in a study of the entire community process, in which
.people strive to maximize values by applying institutions to re-
sources."16 More fully expressed, they think of the community process
"in terms of people, with varying perspectives, employing base values,
by practices (myth and technique), to effect a redistribution among
people of certain demanded or 'scope' values." 7 "In any particular
study of specific value processes, the people and their perspectives,
the situations in which they demand values, the base values they em-
ploy, the practices by which they shape and share values, and the
effects they obtain upon distribution of values may be described in as
much detail as the materials permit or as the particular problem of the
14 Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944) 58.
35While their treatise on jurisprudence is still in preparation, their theories
and an application thereof to international law are set out in a series of lectures
delivered by Professor McDougal at the Academy of International Law at the
Hague in 1953. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contempo-
rary Conception, 82 Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International, 137
(1954).
16 McDougal, op. cit., at 167.
17 Id., 168.
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investigator requires. It may be emphasized that any particular value
may be either employed as a means or sought as an end, may be
either a base value or a scope value."
18
Professors Lasswell and MeDougal list as their values power,
respect, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, and recti-
tude."' Their is no magic in any particular list, but the list should be
such that one can subsume under one or another of the symbols all the
"major categories of desired events"2 0 in the community. It should be
sufficiently detailed to enable convenient study of related "desired
events" together.
They "emphasize that law is a dynamic process in which policies
are constantly being made and applied"21 but they do not advocate
arbitrary decision. Decisions should be based on community values.
If, before making a decision, a court will study the entire problem in
the light of the entire community process, in the light of the probable
effect of any suggested decision on the value distribution in the com-
munity, it will inevitably be presented with alternative policies and be
in better position to make a rational choice among them. This does not
mean abandonment of legal doctrine and legal rules. Doctrine and
rules (subsumed under the symbol "myth" in their description of the
community process) are important practices by which people engage
in the process of striving to maximize values.
If one should apply these theories to the cases under discussion, it
is almost inconceivable that-he could come up with a decision which
did not permit variation of implementation of the Brown decree on a
temporal and geographical basis. In a matter of the complexity of this,
a solution appropriate in Adair County, Kentucky,22 would not neces-
sarily be appropriate in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama.
23
As stated above, the problem is how to remove from the Negro the
"mark of oppression."2 4 Perhaps, this objective could have been ap-
proached more rapidly if the Court had adhered to the "separate but
equal" doctrine, with rigorous insistence on true equality in all tangible
IN Id., 168-169.
19 Id.. 168. For a more detailed exposition of the concept of values used by
them see Lasswell and Kaplan, Appendix: On Power and Influence, at page 223
of Lasswell, Power and Personality (1948).
2) McDougal, op. cit. at 168.
*-1 Id. at 183.
22 Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 1955), in which the court
ordered immediate admission of Negro pupils to schools without regard to race
or color, in a community where tension between the races has been negligible.
23 Lucy v. Adams, (N.D. Ala. 1955) 134 F.Supp. 235; contempt proceedings
in same case, Civ. No. 652, Feb. 29, 1956, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 323 (1956). This
case illustrates difficulties over admission of one Negro to a state university in an
area of high racial tension.
24 Note 13, supra.
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factors. The southern whites would then have seen that the only
alternative to integration was the immediate provision of adequate
school facilities for Negroes. Then all the emotional, intellectual and
physical energies which are now being marshalled to hold the Negro
down would have been marshalled to improve him educationally, with
the result that the cultural gap between the races would have been
lessened from year to year, and the Negro race would have gradually
become more and more acceptable to integration in more and more
facets of community life. As it is, all the white energies, in the areas
where the Negro needs help most, are being marshalled to prevent any
improvement of the Negro, with the prospect that he may be denied
any educational facilities whatever for an extended period, with the
probable result that the race will become less and less acceptable for
integration as the years roll by. And in the meantime racial tensions
are being further increased, with the probability that discrimination
will increase, not lessen. It should not be overlooked that the effects
described by Kardiner and Ovesey 25 are effects on Negroes of Harlem,
an area where the rule of the Brown decision has been in force for
decades. It is true that the effects are traceable to southern origins,
but there is no evidence that abolition of school segregation has elimi-
nated discrimination anywhere.
The foregoing is not set forth as an attempt to reopen the Brown
case. It would be virtually impossible for the Court to overrule that
decision even though each of the justices became convinced that they
had made a mistake. The analysis is presented to emphasize the point
that legal problems having such broad and deep social implications
cannot be properly solved by recourse to law books alone, nor by
recourse alone to one facet of psychologic science. The courts, in fur-
ther steps to implement the Brown decree, should study the whole
community process with all the scientific tools available. And that is
where the sociologist comes in. He and the lawyer must work to-
gether, each getting as much insight into the science of the other as
possible. And this goes for the other social scientists too. The courts
need to be informed, not only of the pertinent legal doctrine, but of
the probable social effects of each suggested step.
25 Id.
